A dialectics system in which argumentative agents play and arbitrate to reach an agreement by Morge, Maxime
A dialectics system in which argumentative agents play
and arbitrate to reach an agreement
Maxime Morge
ENS Mines
158, cours Fauriel
F-42023 Saint Etienne Cedex 2, France
morge@emse.fr
ABSTRACT
We propose in this paper a formal framework in which agents
arbitrate and play to reach an agreement. The argumentation-
based reasoning manages the conflicts between arguments
having different strengths for different agents. The argu-
mentative agents justify the hypothesis to which they com-
mit and take into account the commitments of their inter-
locutors. A third agent is responsible of the final decision
outcome which is taken by resolving the conflict between
two players according to their competence.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most real-world decisions must compose divergent actor
interests and perspectives. Because the success of a deci-
sion depends on the extent to which people believe it has
been reached fairly, they must have a role in forming even
if they disagree with the final outcome. This observation
changes the way we appreciate the democratic procedures.
A decision must be collective and argued [12]. We can distin-
guish two different modalities of formation of political will :
the representative democracy and the dialogical democracy.
The representative democracy is a process of political-will
in which the individual preferences are aggregated to obtain
outcome. The electors an the lay public delegate their power
to the elect and the experts. The dialogical democracy is a
participative fair effect process to compose the interests and
perspectives [7]. The civil society debate and deliberate.
We claim that such a process can be formalized by a Multi-
Agent System (MAS) where autonomous and social agents
argue.
Most of the existing formal framework for inter-agent in-
teraction are based on speech acts theory [15]. For example,
FIPA-ACL define communicative acts by pre/post condi-
tions bearing on the mental attitudes of agents. This men-
talistic approach is not suitable for our objective. (1) The
mental concepts are not adapted to manage the conflicts.
(2) The communication has no public semantics to be judged
in an objective perspective. (3) However isolated commu-
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nicative acts do not suffice to achieve a common goal, the
existing protocols are too rigid for the debate [9].
By contrast, recent works [4, 13, 14] are inspired by the
dialectics [6, 10, 16]. Not being a first attempt, this paper
focus on the technical exploration of these argumentative
techniques for the formalization of a dialogical democracy.
We present in this paper a dialectics system. This is a formal
framework in which agents communicate to reach a collec-
tive decision. (1) The argumentation-based reasoning mech-
anism manages the interaction between arguments for and
against some conclusions. (2) Since the communication lan-
guage has a social semantics, every agents confer the same
meaning to the messages and any third agent is able to draw
similar inferences from the conflicts. (3) The dialogue is a
flexible and refined process to reach an agreement.
Paper overview. Section 2 presents the reasoning mech-
anism of agents to manage the conflicts between arguments
having different strengths for different agents. In accordance
with this background, we describe in section 3 a system of
argumentative agents where each agent justifies her posi-
tion and takes into account the positions of her interlocu-
tors. In section 4, we define the formal framework in which
the agents collaborate to reach an agreement. The section
5 illustrates this framework with a persuasion protocol.
2. ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK
When a set of autonomous agents argue, they share knowl-
edge on which they have their own priorities. That is the
reason why the argumentation framework which is proposed
in this section is equivalent to a value-based argumentation
framework [3, 4]. Moreover, this framework is based upon a
logic language [11, 1].
A multi-agents system is a set of social and autonomous
agents (written 0A). Each of them has an identifier agi ∈
0A. They share knowledge, i.e. a set of sentences in a
common knowledge language, denoted L0. Moreover,
the agents use the same classical inference, denoted `0. As
in [11], the formulae of the background logic are defined as
rules as r : L0 ← L1, ..., Ln where L0 . . . Ln are positive or
explicit negative ground literals.
The agents share an argumentative theory, i.e. a set of
rules promoting values:
Definition 1. Let 0A = {ag1, . . . , agn} be a set of agents.
The value-based argumentative theory
AT0A = 〈T , V, promote〉 is defined by a triple where:
• T is a theory, i.e. a finite set of rules in L0;
• V is a non-empty finite set of values {v1, . . . , vt};
• promote : T → V maps from the rules to the values.
We say that the rule r relates to the value v if r promotes
v. For every r ∈ T , promote(r) ∈ V .
The values have different priorities for different agents [6].
Therefore, agents are individuated by their priorities be-
tween values:
Definition 2. Let agi ∈ 0A be an agent. The value-
based argumentative theory of the agent agi is a 4-tuple
ATi = 〈T , V, promote,i〉 where :
• AT0A = 〈T , V, promote〉 is a value-based argumenta-
tive theory as previously defined;
• i is the priority relation of the agent agi, i.e. a strict
complete ordering relation on V .
The priority relation of the agent agi is a transitive, ir-
reflexive, asymmetric, and complete relation on V . This
static relation makes it possible for agents to stratify the
theory into finite non-overlapping sets as in [1]. According
to the agent agi, the priority level of a non-empty theory
T ⊆ T (written leveli(T )) is the least important value pro-
moted by one element in T .
The priority relation captures the value hierarchy of an
agent on one hand and the theory gathers the knowledge on
the other hand. The arguments are built on this knowledge.
An argument is composed of a conclusion and a premise, i.e.
a set of rules from which the conclusion can be inferred:
Definition 3. Let T be a theory in L0.
An argument is couple A = 〈P, c〉 where c is a rule and P ⊆
T is a non-empty set of rules such as : i) P is consistent
and minimal for set inclusion ii) P `0 c. P is the premise
of A, written P = premise(A). c is the conclusion of A,
denoted c = conclusion(A).
A′ is a sub-argument of A if the premise of A′ is included
in the premise of A. A′ is a trivial argument if the premise
of A′ is a singleton. Since the theory T can be inconsistent,
the set of arguments (denoted A(T )) will conflict.
The relation of attack between arguments in a theory is
based on the possible conflicts between a literal and its ex-
plicit negation.
Definition 4. Let T be a theory in L0 and A = 〈P, c〉, B =
〈P ′, c′〉 ∈ A(T ) two arguments. A attacks B
(written attacks(A, B)) iff :
∃P1 ⊆ P, P2 ⊆ P
′ such as P1 `0 L and P2 `0 ¬L.
Similarly, we say that a set S of arguments attacks B if B
is attacked by an argument in S.
Because each agent is associated to a particular priority
relation, the attack of an argument over another argument
can be ignored. The strength of an argument (strengthi(A) =
leveli(premise(A)) depends on the priority relation i. Ac-
cording to an agent, an argument defeats another argument
if they attack each other and the second argument is not
stronger than the first one:
Definition 5. Let ATi = 〈T , V, promote,i〉 be the value-
based argumentative theory of the agent agi and A = 〈P, c〉,
B = 〈P ′, c′〉 ∈ A(T ) two arguments.
A defeats B for ATi (written defeatsi(A, B)) iff
∃P1 ⊆ P, P2 ⊆ P
′ such as :
1. P1 `0 L and P2 `0 ¬L;
2. ¬(leveli(P1)i leveli(P2)).
Similarly, we say that a set S of arguments defeats B if B
is defeated by an argument in S.
Contrary to the relation of attack, the relation of defeat
is asymmetric. Moreover, the attack is an objective relation
and the defeat relation is a subjective one. Because we are
interested in the individuated viewpoint of each agent, we
focus on the following notion of acceptance:
Definition 6. Let ATi = 〈T , V, promote,i〉 be the value-
based argumentative theory of the agent agi. Let A ∈ A(T )
be an argument and S ⊆ A(T ) a set of arguments. A is
subjectively acceptable by ATi wrt S iff
∀B ∈ A(T ) defeatsi(B, A)⇒ defeatsi(S, B);
Example 1. Let us consider two American citizen argu-
ing about the new president. The value-based argumentative
theory of the agent ag1 (resp. ag2) is represented at left
(resp. at right) of the figure 1.
The two agents share a theory, i.e. a set of rules (r11, . . . , r6)
and a set of values (v1, . . . , v6). The rules corresponding to
the goal relate to the value v1. The common sense rules
relate to the value v2. The other rules, which specify par-
ticular opinions, relate to the values v3, . . . , v6. According
to an agent, a value above another one has priority over it.
Because the theory is inconsistent, the five following argu-
ments conflict :
A1 = ({r6, r3(bush)}, pres(bush)←)
A2 = ({r5, r22(kerry), r11}, pres(bush)←)
A′2 = ({r5, r22(kerry)},¬pres(kerry)←)
B = ({r4, r12(bush), r22(bush), r21}, pres(kerry)←)
B′ = ({r4, r12(bush), r22(bush)},¬pres(bush)←)
A′2 is a sub-argument of A2 and B
′ is a sub-argument of B.
Let us consider the value-based argumentative theory of the
agent ag1 (cf figure 1). The strength of A1 is v3 and the
1 V premise(A1) premise(A2) premise(A
′
2) premise(B) premise(B
′)
v1 r11
r21
v2 r12(bush) r12(bush)
r22(kerry) r22(bush) r22(bush) r22(bush)
v6 r6
v5 r5 r5 A2
v4 r4 r4 B
v3 r3(bush) A1
Figure 2: The value-based argumentative theory of the first
agent
strength of B′ is v4. B defeats A1 but A1 does not defeat
B. The strength of A′2 is v5 and the strength of B is v4.
A2 defeats B but B do not defeat A2. The set {A1A2} is
subjectively acceptable wrt A(T ).
Let us consider the value-based argumentative theory of the
agent ag2 (cf figure 1).
The strength of A1 is v6 and the strength of B
′ is v4. B
defeats A1 but A1 do not defeat B. The strength of A2 is
v5 and the strength of B
′ is v4. B defeats A2 but A2 do not
defeat B. The set {B} is subjectively acceptable wrt A(T ).
In such an argumentation framework, the knowledge and
the values are common but the values have different prior-
ities for different agents. At the opposite, the knowledge is
distributed in a system of argumentative agents.
1 V T
v1 r11 : pres(bush)← ¬(pres(kerry))
r21 : pres(kerry)← ¬(pres(bush))
v2 r12(x) : weak(x)← silly(x)
r22(x) : ¬pres(x)← weak(x)
v6 r6 : current pres(bush)←
v5 r5 : weak(kerry)←
v4 r4 : silly(bush)←
v3 r3(x) : pres(x)← current pres(x)
2 V T
v1 r11 : pres(bush)← ¬(pres(kerry))
r21 : pres(kerry)← ¬(pres(bush))
v2 r12(x) : weak(x)← silly(x)
r22(x) : ¬pres(x)← weak(x)
v3 r3(x) : pres(x)← current pres(x)
v4 r4 : silly(bush)←
v5 r5 : weak(kerry)←
v6 r6 : current pres(bush)←
Figure 1: The value-based argumentative theory of the agents
2 V premise(A1) premise(A2) premise(A
′
2) premise(B) premise(B
′)
v1 r11
r21
v2 r12(bush) r12(bush)
r22(kerry) r22(bush) r22(bush) r22(bush)
v3 r3(bush)
v4 r4 r4 B
v5 r5 r5 A2
v6 r6 A1
Figure 3: The value-based argumentative theory of the
second agent
3. SYSTEM OF ARGUMENTATIVE AGENTS
Because the beliefs of social agents can be common, com-
plementary or contradictory, agents argue to exchange hy-
pothesis and reason together. For this purpose, the system
of argumentative agents which is proposed in this section
is similar to the AMP framework [2, 13]. Moreover, agents
valuate the perceived commitments with respect to the esti-
mated competence of the agents from whom the information
is obtained.
The argumentative agents, which have their own beliefs
and their own values, record the commitments of their inter-
locutors. Moreover, each argumentative agent valuates the
reputation of her interlocutors. Therefore, an argumentative
agent is in conformance with the following definition:
Definition 7. The argumentative agent agi ∈ 0A is
defined by a 6-tuple agi = 〈Ti, Vi,i, promotei,∪j 6=iCS
i
j ,≺i〉
where:
• Ti is a personal theory, i.e. a set of personal rules in
L0;
• Vi is a set of personal values;
• promotei : Ti → Vi maps from the personal rules to the
personal values;
• i is the priority relation, i.e. a strict complete or-
dering relation on Vi;
• CSij is a commitment store, i.e. a set of rules in L0.
CSij(t) contains commitments taken before or at time
t, where agent agj is the debtor and agent agi the cred-
itor;
• ≺i is the reputation relation, i.e. a strict complete
ordering relation on 0A.
The personal theories are not necessarily disjoint. We
call common theory the set of rules explicitly shared by the
agents: TΩA ⊆ ∩agi∈0ATi. The personal theories can be
complementary or contradictory. We call joint theory the
set of rules distributed in the system: T0A = ∪agi∈0ATi.
Similarly, the sets of personal values are not necessarily dis-
joint. We call common values the values explicitly shared by
the agents: VΩA ⊆ ∩agi∈0AVi. The personal rules relate to
the personal values. For every r ∈ Ti, promotei(r) = v ∈ Vi.
On the one hand, the common rules relate to the common
values. For every r ∈ TΩA , promoteΩA(r) = v ∈ VΩA . On
the other hand, the agent own rules relate to the agent own
values. For every r ∈ Ti−TΩA , promotei(r) = v ∈ Vi−VΩA .
Reputation is a social concept that links an agent to her
interlocutors. It is also a leveled relation [8]. The individ-
uated reputation relations, which are transitive, irreflexive,
asymmetric, and complete relations on 0A, preserve these
properties. agj ≺i agk denotes that an agent agi trusts an
agent agk more than another agent agj .
In order to take into account the rules notified in the com-
mitment stores, the agents are associated to the following
extended theory:
Definition 8. The extended theory of the argumen-
tative agent agi is the value-based argumentative theory
AT∗i = 〈T
∗
i , V
∗
i , promote
∗
i ,
∗
i 〉 where:
• T ∗i = Ti∪ [
S
j 6=i CS
i
j ] is the extended personal theory of
the agent composed of the personal theory of this agent
and the set of perceived commitments;
• V ∗i = Vi ∪ [
S
j 6=i{v
i
j}] is the extended set of personal
values of the agent composed of the set of personal val-
ues of this agent and the reputation values of her in-
terlocutors;
• promote∗i : T
∗
i → V
∗
i is the extension of the function
promotei which maps from the rules in the extended
personal theory to the extended set of personal values.
On the one hand, the personal rules relate to the per-
sonal values. On the other hand, the rules in the com-
mitment store CSij relate to the reputation value v
i
j ;
• ∗i is the extended priority relation of the agent, i.e.
a strict complete ordering relation on V ∗i .
When the values are common, they are universal as true.
When the values are agent’s own, they are in conformance
with her particular aspiration [6]. That is the reason why
the common values have priority over the other values. Since
the agent argues, the personal values will have priority over
the reputation values. Henceforth, the extended priority
relation of the agent is constrained as follows:
∀agj ∈ 0A ∀vω ∈ VΩA∀v ∈ Vi − VΩA (v
i
j 
∗
i v 
∗
i vω)
An argument is acceptable by the argumentative agent agi
if it is subjectively acceptable by AT∗i wrt the extended set
of arguments A(T ∗i ). S
∗
i denotes the set of acceptable argu-
ments for the argumentative agent agi. This agent is con-
vinced by a rule r if it is the conclusion of an acceptable
argument: ∃A ∈ S∗i conclusion(A) = r.
The agents utter messages to exchange their beliefs. The
syntax of messages is in conformance with the communica-
tion language, CL0. A message Mk = 〈Sk, Hk, Ak〉 ∈ CL0
has an identifier Mk. It is uttered by a speaker (Sk =
speaker(Mk)) and addressed to a hearer (Hk = hearer(Mk)),
i.e. one agent in the audience. Ak = act(Mk) is the speech
act of the message. It is composed of a locution and a con-
tent. The locution is one of the following: question, assert,
unknow, concede, challenge, withdraw. The content, also
called hypothesis, is a rule or a set of rules in L0.
The speech acts have an argumentative and social seman-
tics [5]. Because a commitment enrich the extended the-
ory of the creditor, the speech acts have a social semantics.
Because a commitment could be justified by the extended
theory of the debtor, the speech acts have an argumentative
semantics.
For example, the figure 4 shows the axiomatic semantics
associated with the assertion of an hypothesis. An agent
can assert a hypothesis if she has an argument for it. The
corresponding commitments stores are updated.
• Message:
Ml = 〈agi, agj , assert(h)〉
• Argumentative semantics:
∃A ∈ A(T ∗i ) conclusion(A) = h
• Social semantics:
for any agent agk in the audience
CSki (t) = CS
k
i (t− 1) ∪ {h}
Figure 4: Axiomatic semantics for assert an hypothesis h
at time t
In a similar way, the figure 5 shows the axiomatic seman-
tics associated with the concession of an hypothesis. The
rational condition for the assertion and the rational condi-
tion for the concession of the same hypothesis by the same
agent distinguish themselves. Agents can assert hypothesis
whether they are supported by a trivial argument or not. By
contrast, agents do not concede all the hypothesis she hears
in spite of they are all supported by a trivial argument.
• Message:
Ml = 〈agi, agj , concede(h)〉
• Argumentative semantics:
∃A ∈ A(T ∗i ) conclusion(A) = h with
(premise(A) 6= {h} ∧ premise(A)6⊆ ∪j 6=i CS
i
j)
• Social semantics:
for any agent agk in the audience
CSki (t) = CS
k
i (t− 1) ∪ {h}
Figure 5: Axiomatic semantics for concede an hypothesis
h at time t
Because the other speech acts (question(h), challenge(h),
unknow(h), and withdraw(h)) have no particular effects on
the commitments stores, they have neither particular ratio-
nal conditions of utterance. In other words, we considere
that the commitments stores are cumulative [10, 16]. We
can note that the rational conditions for the assertion of a
hypothesis and for its explicit negation are not necessary
mutually excluded. Since each argumentative agent has dif-
ferent priorities, they will be thoughtful[2]. In other words,
an agent can assert any hypothesis for which she has an
acceptable argument.
The hypothesis which are received must be valuated. Since
the agents are more or less authoritative regarding the do-
main, the commitments will be considered in accordance
with the estimated competence of the agents from whom
the information is obtained.
Example 2. If the argumentative agent ag1 utters the
following message:
M1 = 〈ag1, ag2, assert(pres(bush)←)〉
the extended theory of the argumentative agent ag2 is repre-
sented in the figure 6. The extended personal theory is com-
∗2 V
∗
2 T
∗
2 TΩA
v1 r11 : pres(bush)← ¬(pres(kerry))
r21 : pres(kerry)← ¬(pres(bush))
v2 r12(x) : weak(x)← silly(x)
r22(x) : ¬pres(x)← weak(x)
v3 r3(x) : pres(x)← current pres(x)
v4 r4 : silly(bush)← B
v5 r5 : weak(kerry)← A2
v6 r6 : current pres(bush)← A1
v21 CS
2
1 ⊇ r7 : pres(bush)← A
′
Figure 6: The extended theory of the second argumentative
agent
posed of the personal theory of this agent and the hypothesis
advanced by the agent ag1: pres(bush)←. The extended set
of personal values is composed of the set of personal val-
ues and the reputation value of the agent ag2. The rules,
which correspond to the goal or the common sense, consist
of the common theory which relate to the common values:
VΩA = {v1, v2}.
The arguments A1, A2, and A
′ support bush. The argu-
ment B support kerry. A′ is a trivial argument based on the
commitment stores which supports bush. Therefore, the hy-
pothesis pres(bush) ← cannot be conceded by the agent ag2
wrt this argument but wrt A1 or A2. Because the agent ag2
has conflicting arguments she can assert the two hypothesis
pres(kerry) ← and pres(bush) ←. If she is thoughtful, she
only assert pres(bush)←.
In such a system of argumentative agents, the knowledge
is exchanged but the agents have different convictions. At
the opposite, a dialectics system makes it possible to reach
an agreement.
4. DIALECTICS SYSTEM
When a set of social and autonomous agents argue, they
reply to each other in order to reach the goal of the inter-
action. In this section we present the formal framework in
which agents play and arbitrate to reach an agreement. The
dialectics system which is proposed in this section is similar
to [14]. Moreover, a third agent arbitrates in accordance
with the estimated competence of the players.
During exchanges, the speech acts are not isolated but
they respond each other. The moves are messages with some
attributes to control the sequence. The syntax of moves is in
conformance with the moves language. A move movek =
〈Mk, Rk, Pk〉 ∈ ML0 has an identifier movek. It contains
a message Mk as defined before. Rk = reply(movek) is the
identifier of the move to which movek responds. A move
(movek) is either an initial move (reply(movek) = nil) or a
replying move (reply(movek) 6= nil). Pk = protocol(movek)
is the name of the protocol which is used.
A dialectics system is composed of three agents. In this
formal framework, two players play moves in front of a third
agent to check the validity of an initial hypothesis.
Definition 9. Let ATΩA = 〈TΩA , VΩA , promoteΩA〉 be a
value-based argumentative theory and r0 a rule in L0. The
dialectics system on the topic r0 is a 7-tuple DSΩM (r0,ATΩA) =
〈N,wit, H, T, convention, Z, (up)p∈N 〉 where :
• N = {init, part} ⊂ 0A is a set of two argumentative
agents called players: the initiator and the partner;
• wit ∈ 0A is a third argumentative agent, called wit-
ness, with a personal theory restricted to the common
theory (Twit = TΩA);
• ΩM ⊆ML0 is a set of well-formed moves;
• H is the set of histories, i.e. the sequences of well-
formed moves s.t. the speaker of a move is determined
at each stage by a turn-taking function and the moves
agree with a convention;
• T : H → N is the turn-taking function determining
the speaker of a move. If the length of the history is
null or even then T (h) = init else T (h) = part;
• convention : H → ΩM is the function determining the
moves which are allowed or not to expand an history;
• Z is the set of dialogues, i.e. the terminal histories
which consist of maximally long histories;
• uinit, upart : H → {−1, 1} are the partial utility func-
tions determining if a player is a winner at a history.
In order to be well-formed, the initial move is a question
about the topic from the initiator to the partner and a re-
plying move from a player references an earlier move uttered
by the other player. In this way, the backtracks are allowed.
The dialogue line is the sub-sequence of moves where all
the backtracks are ignored. In order to avoid loops, the re-
dundancy of hypothesis is forbidden in the assertions of the
same dialogue line. Obviously, all the moves should contain
the same value for the protocol parameter.
At the history h, the witness is associated to the extended
theory
AT∗wit(h) = 〈T
∗
wit(h), V
∗
wit, promote
∗
wit,
∗
wit〉 where:
• the extended personal theory is composed of the per-
sonal theory and the commitments of players: T ∗wit(h) =
TΩA ∪ CS
wit
init(h) ∪ CS
wit
part(h);
• the extended set of values is composed of the set of
personal values and the reputation values of the two
players: V ∗wit = VΩA ∪ {v
wit
init, v
wit
part}.
S∗wit(h) (resp. S
∗
p (h)) denotes the set of acceptable argu-
ments for the witness (resp. one player).
The witness is responsible of the stable agreement. The
acceptability of arguments by the witness depends on the
reputation of the players. In other words, the arbitrage of
the witness depends on the arguments exchanged and the
estimated competence of the players. We said that r0 is
provable at the history h (written provableh(r0)) if the
witness is convinced by r0 at the history h.
Since the witness arbitrates, she will attribute the victory
to one, two or none of the players in accordance with their
initial convictions. The witness decides if a player is a winner
or not at a history:
• if provableh(r0) then (up(h) = 1 ⇔
∃A ∈ S∗p (h0) conclusion(A) = r0);
• if provableh(¬r0) then (up(h) = 0 ⇔
∃A ∈ S∗p (h0) conclusion(A) = r0).
Because the definition of the dialectics system make no
assumptions about the initial convictions of players, we can
consider any dialogue which the final outcome is an agree-
ment: persuasion, information-seeking, inquiry or any com-
bination of these basic dialogues [16].
5. PERSUASION
When a set of social and autonomous agents argue, they
collaborate to confront their convictions. In this section we
illustrate our dialectics system with the protocol of persua-
sion proposed in [2] where agents resolve their conflict by
verbal means.
The persuasion protocol (denoted PP) is an unique-respond
protocol where players can reply just once to the other player’s
moves. In other words, the backtracks are forbidden and all
the histories are dialogue lines. Therefore, the convention is
restricted to the set of sequence rules represented in the ta-
ble 5. Each rule specifies the authorized replying moves. For
example, the rule of ”Assertion/Refutation” (written srA/R)
specifies the authorized moves replying to the previous as-
sertion (assert(H)). The speech acts resist or surrender to
the previous one. The surrendering acts close the dialogue.
A concession (concede(H)) surrenders to the previous as-
sertion. A challenge (challenge(h)) and the assertion of its
explicit negation (assert(¬h)) resist to the previous asser-
tion.
Sequences rules Speech acts Resisting replies Surrendering replies
srQ/A question({r0}) assert({r0}) unknow({r0})
assert({¬r0})
srA/R assert(H) challenge(h), h ∈ H concede(H)
assert(¬h), h ∈ H
srC/A challenge(h) assert(H), H `0 h withdraw(h)
srT unknow(H) ∅ ∅
concede(H) ∅ ∅
withdraw(H) ∅ ∅
Table 1: Set of speech acts and the potential an-
swers.
We can note that the rational conditions of utterances
for the allowed replying moves are not necessary mutually
excluded. Since the players are open-minded, they will try
to give their opinions, i.e a concession (concede(H)) or a
refutation (assert(¬h)), in replying to the assertions [2].
Since the players are cooperative, they will give their opin-
ions, i.e. a confirmation (assert({r0})) or an invalidation
(assert({¬r0})), in replying to a question. The players re-
sist in the debate.
An agent initiates a persuasion when she wants confront
her viewpoint with the partner. If the partner has no argu-
ments against/for the topic, she pleads ignorance and closes
the dialogue. If the players have the same convictions, the
witness is convinced and the dialogue closes. Otherwise, the
goal of the dialogue is the resolution of the conflict by verbal
means.
Example 3. Let us consider the persuasion about the can-
didate kerry. The extended argumentative theories of the
players are represented in the figure 3. The initiator is open-
minded and the partner is cooperative. The commitments
stores result from the sequence of moves. The arbitrage of
T0A
V ∗init T
∗
init TΩA T
∗
part V
∗
part
v1 r11 : pres(bush)← ¬(pres(kerry)) v1
r21 : pres(kerry)← ¬(pres(bush))
v2 r12(x) : weak(x)← silly(x) v2
r22(x) : ¬pres(x)← weak(x)
v5 r5(x) : weak(kerry)← A2 B r4 : silly(bush)← v4
vinitpart pres(kerry)← B
′ A′ ¬pres(kerry)← vpartinit
A2 weak(kerry)←
move1 = 〈init, part, ∅, PP, question(pres(kerry)←)〉
move2 = 〈part, init, move1, PP, assert(pres(kerry)←)〉
move3 = 〈init, part, move2, PP, assert(¬pres(kerry)←)〉
move4 = 〈part, init, move3, PP, challenge(¬pres(kerry)←)〉
move5 = 〈init, part, move4, PP, assert({r5, r22(kerry)})〉
move6 = 〈part, init, move5, PP, challenge(weak(kerry))〉
move7 = 〈init, part, move6, PP, withdraw(weak(kerry))〉
Figure 7: An example of persuasive dialogue
the witness depends on the estimated competence of the play-
ers. If the partner is considered as more competent than the
initiator, pres(kerry)← is provable when the dialogue closes.
Otherwise, ¬pres(kerry)← is provable.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has been a technical exploration of the ar-
gumentative techniques for the formalization of a collective
decision-making with a justified outcome. For this purpose,
we have proposed a formal framework in which agents play
and arbitrate to reach an agreement. The argumentation-
based reasoning which has been proposed manage the con-
flicts between arguments having different strengths for dif-
ferent agents. The argumentative agents justify the hypoth-
esis to which they commit and take into account the com-
mitments of their interlocutors. A third agent is responsible
of the final decision outcome and resolves the conflict be-
tween two players according to their competence. As the
dialectics framework is well-defined, we are able to investi-
gate the proprieties of dialogues such as the correctness and
the completeness.
The dialectics process proposed in this paper compose the
interests and perspectives. However, we cannot deny the
importance of collective learnings to enrich the political de-
bate. A rational citizen would determine his preferences af-
ter learning the preferences of others. For this purpose, the
priorities must be dynamic and determined in the course of
the dialogue.
7. REFERENCES
[1] Leila Amgoud and Claudette Cayrol. A reasoning
model based on the production of acceptable
arguments. Annals of Maths and AI, 34(1-3):197–215,
2002.
[2] Leila Amgoud, Nicolas Maudet, and Simon Parsons.
An argumentation-based semantics for agent
communication languages. In F. van Harmelen, editor,
Proc. of the 15th European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 38–42. IOS Press, Amsterdan, 2002.
[3] T.J.M Bench-Capon. Value based argumentation
frameworks. In Proceedings of Non Monotonic
Reasoning, pages 444–453, 2002.
[4] T.J.M Bench-Capon. Persuasion in practical argument
using value based argument frameworks. Journal of
Logic and Computation, 13(3):429–448, 2003.
[5] Jamal Bentahar, Bernard Moulin, and Brahim
Chaib-draa. Specifying and implementing a persuasion
dialogue game using commitments and arguments. In
Proc. of the workshop ArgMAS in AAMAS, pages
130–148.
[6] Perelman C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca L. Traite´ de
l’Argumentation - La Nouvelle Rhe´torique. Presses
Universitaires de France, 1958.
[7] Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe.
Agir dans un monde incertain. Seuil, 2001.
[8] C. Castelfranchi and R. Falcone. Principles of trust in
mas: Cognitive anatomy, social importance, and
quantification. In Proceedings of ICMAS’98, pages
72–79, 1998.
[9] Frank Dignum, Barbara Dunin-Keplicz, and Rineke
Verbrugge. Agent theory for team formation by
dialogue. In Cristiano Castelfranchi and Yves
Lesperance, editors, Agent Theories Architectures and
Languages, number LNAI 1986 in Intelligent Agents
VII, pages 150–166. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[10] Charles L. Hamblin. Fallacies. Methuen, 1970.
[11] Antonis C. Kakas and Pavlos Moratis. Argumentative
agent deliberation, roles and context. In Jurgen Dix,
Joo Alexandre Leite, and Ken Satoh, editors,
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
volume 70. Elsevier, 2002.
[12] P. McBurney and S. Parsons. Intelligent systems to
support deliberative democracy in environmental
regulation. Information and Communications
Technology Law, 10(1):33–43, 2001.
[13] Peter McBurney and Simon Parsons. Games that
agents play: A formal framework for dialogues
between autonomous agents. Journal of Logic,
Language and Information, 11(3):315–334, 2002.
[14] Henry Prakken. On dialogue systems with speech acts,
arguments, and counterarguments. In
M. Ojeda-Aciego, I.P.d. Guzman, G. Brewka, and
L.M. Pereira, editors, Proc. of the 7th European
Workshop on Logic for Artificial Intelligence
(JELIA’2000), number 1919 in Lecture Notes in AI,
pages 224–238. Springer Verlag, 2000.
[15] J.R. Searle. Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosophy
of Language. Cambridge University Press, 1969.
[16] D. Walton and E. Krabbe. Commitment in Dialogue.
SUNY Press, 1995.
